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Abstract
Based on anthropological and historical consid-
erations, this paper analyses the evolution of the 
relationship between Western law and aboriginal 
custom in Latin America by focusing on the most 
tangible and problematic issue in customary law: 
land tenure. My aim is to provide a critical review 
of the impact of the rule of law in the arrangement 
of the alternative cosmologies that flows from the 
material and spiritual relationship of indigenous 
groups with their lands. Historical and political 
issues will be emphasised to illustrate the current 
problems concerning the interaction between cus-
tom and formal law in the case of the Mapuche 
people from Chile. By looking at some recent 
developments in the arena of public law, indige-
nous legislation and legal doctrine, the paper 
finally suggests how private law discourse, which 
traditionally has paid almost no attention to the 
discussion of indigenous law, might be integrated 
into the legal systems that widely recognise indig-
enous customs.
□×
Rodrigo Míguez Núñez*
Indigenous Customary Law in a Civil Law 
Context: Latin America and the Chilean Case
1 Introduction
It is impossible to encompass the vast historical 
discourse on indigenous customary law in Latin 
America within the scope of this paper for two 
reasons. First, there is no clear theory on Latin 
American customary practices, nor is there a sys-
tematic body of legal sources that permits the 
systematic analysis of indigenous customary law. 
Second, the cultural diversity of the indigenous 
groups that live in these territories is vast. This 
difficulty was foreseen by the most outstanding 
jurist of Indian law, the Spaniard Juan Solórzano 
Pereira, who, in the middle of the 17th century, 
asserted that »the customs of each region are as 
diverse as the air that surrounds them and the 
boundaries that divide them«.1 It is clear, therefore, 
that any attempt to generalise customs in the Latin 
American context is highly risky.
In order to avoid such complexities, my aim is to 
outline the main legal milestones in the evolution 
of the relationship between Western law and 
indigenous customary law in Latin America by 
concentrating on the case of the Mapuche, a group 
of indigenous people settled in south-central Chile 
and southwestern Argentina (including parts of 
present day Patagonia).
The aim of this essay is mainly descriptive. I first 
briefly outline the notion of custom in the Latin 
American indigenous context to provide a general 
theoretical framework. I then explain the historical 
background of the relationship between Western 
law and aboriginal custom in Latin America. I 
finally analyse the Chilean case with regards to its 
Mapuche inhabitants, concluding with some ob-
servations. Historical and political issues will be 
emphasised to illustrate the current problems con-
cerning the interaction between custom and for-
mal law. I endeavour to provide a comparative and 
critical review of the impact of the rule of law in 
the arrangement of indigenous customs in Latin 
America. 
2 Custom in an aboriginal legal context
It is evident that in the Western world, ethnog-
raphy, cultural studies and history have contri-
buted to our understanding of custom. This is 
particularly true in studies of indigenous contexts. 
Briefly, such studies have illustrated the relevance 
of land, spirituality and the reciprocity of the social 
relationship in the indigenous people’s cosmology. 
As a result, the infusion of law with spirituality and 
cultural practices could be seen as a common 
element for aboriginal groups. In this sacred world, 
the law that regulates social relations could only be 
described as a »legal divine tradition«.2
The above conceptualisation of the aboriginal 
legal system is especially pronounced in the case of 
Latin American indigenous groups. For instance, 
the relationship between man and the land in the 
highlands of the central Andes (Peru, Bolivia and 
northern Chile and Argentina) displays the sym-
bolic or mystical nature of the natives’ perception 
of the world as the main characteristic of the legal 
tradition. This notion presupposes a particularly 
close relationship with nature, a vision of the 
cosmos in which all physical activity is invariably 
bound together with the spiritual world. Notably, 
we are dealing here with a holistic notion of the 
relationship with nature, since the whole of the 
land tenure system cannot be explained with refer-
ence to its individual parts alone. That is, we cannot 
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1 S P (1736 [1647]) II, 
XXV, 9.
2 G (2000) 68.
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explain the existence of man without the land, and 
vice versa.3
The same applies when looking at the Mapuche 
people. For instance, the contemporary Mapuche 
man finds himself dealing simultaneously with 
two incompatible notions of land rights. One of 
them is a legacy of the Western conquest, as is the 
word »property« itself, which has no equivalent in 
the aboriginal language. The other is holism, as just 
described regarding the notion of customary law in 
indigenous context. In this perspective dances, 
prayers and ceremonies in honour of the Earth at 
seed times and harvest reflect the sacred bond 
between man and the land.4
It should be noted that this approach to the 
aboriginal legal system is not exclusive to ethno-
historic and anthropological circles. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights since 2001 has 
consistently affirmed that »for indigenous com-
munities, relations with the land are not merely a 
matter of possession and production but a material 
and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, 
even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit 
it to future generations«.5 On that basis the Court 
has affirmed that »The protection of the communal 
ownership of indigenous peoples must take into 
account that the Land is closely related to their oral 
traditions and expressions, customs and languages, 
arts and rituals, knowledge and practices concern-
ing nature, culinary arts, customary law, clothing, 
philosophy and values«.6 Notably then, by pro-
claiming that indigenous communal land rights 
stem from »ancestral use or occupancy«, not from 
any act of the State, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has created an alternative concep-
tion of indigenous rights based on their customs.7
It is relevant that the notion of customary law, 
especially in traditional societies, is constantly 
changing. Moreover, the diversity of a customary 
legal regime makes it impossible to seek a universal 
definition for customary law for all times and 
contexts. Yet, following a recent systematisation, 
some similarities for most of the Latin American 
indigenous legal traditions emerge: a) communal 
and collective aspects of ownership or free / open 
sharing of resources; b) a mix of (reciprocal) rights 
and responsibilities grounded in a spiritual value 
system; and c) a central ethical understanding that 
resources must be used in a way that is productive 
and beneficial to all members, including future 
generations (solidarity / brotherhood and eco-cen-
tric ethics).8
3 Customary law in the Latin American 
context: some historical remarks
3.1 The pre-Colombian and colonial era
As the legal historian Fernando Suárez pointed 
out, to »talk about indigenous customs is to talk 
about pre-Colombian law, because in primitive 
societies, and especially in the Indies, custom is 
the Law«.9 Similarly, Bederman asserts that, »pre-
sumably all law in preliterate culture is custom«.10
In fact, before Spanish colonisation custom was the 
real law, and legislation or statute law was just a 
concept taken from Roman law and imposed.11
Each indigenous group had their own rules, and 
those were customary rules. In this context, imme-
morial rules can be considered a dynamic process 
rather than a strictly defined and static set of rules. 
It is a process that evolves from a »way of life« of 
the people combined with precedents applying to 
special cases. It is also important to note that, 
although some pictographic writing among native 
groups, such as the Aztecs, was evident, the oral 
tradition, by definition unwritten, was abided and 
accepted by generations in the indigenous cultures 
of Latin America. 
3 V (2011) 51. For a more de-
tailed account of this relationship in 
the Andean worldview, see: M 
N (2013a) 113 f. 
4 For more on the Mapuche’s beliefs 
and symbolism, see C
(1999). Generally, on the legal as-
sumptions of the man-land relation-
ship in Mapuche society see L
(2004) 105–108.
5 IACtHR Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicara-
gua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgement of August 31, 2001. Series 
C No. 79 § 149; IACtHR Case Saw-
hoyamaxa Community v. Paraguay. 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgement of March 29, 2006. Series 
C No. 146 § 131.
6 IACtHR Case Yakye Axa Community 
v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and 
Costs. Judgement of June 17, 2005. 
Series C No. 125 § 154. For more on 
this, see: MH (2011) 234 f.
7 See: Indigenous and tribal people’s 
rights over their ancestral lands and 
natural resources: Norms and juris-
prudence of the Inter-American hu-
man rights system, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 
Doc. 56/09, 30 December 2009, Para. 
68. See also T (2014) 108.
8 T (2014) 31.
9 S (1995–1996) 119.
10 B (2010) 13.
11 S (1995–1996) 127.
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Evidently, this assertion complicates the knowl-
edge of customs in terms of the sources of pre-
Colombian and colonial law. Briefly, the record of 
indigenous customs in this period is based on 
information collected by the first Spanish author-
ities, in the form of judicial records, court cases 
related to land, and so on, or descriptions incorpo-
rated in the chronicles written by Indians (Gua-
mán Poma), mestizos (Garcilaso) or Spanish »in-
dianised« intellectuals (Juan de Betanzos).12 The 
colonial analysis of indigenous customs was usu-
ally limited to particular cases or geographical 
areas, which explains why studies of the legal 
phenomena of customary law during Spanish rule 
are still fragmented. Scholars, in fact, examine 
customs as a chapter in general works on Latin 
American legal history. As a result, studies treating 
customary indigenous law are still uncommon and 
exceptional.13 It is, therefore, quite proper to 
reiterate an assertion Rafael Altamira made in 
1948: »it can be said that in respect of legislation 
and indigenous customary practice which have 
become part of colonial Indian law, everything is 
still to be done«.14
In addition to this first theoretical gap, it should 
be stressed that jurists in the colonial period did 
not construct an organic explanation of indigenous 
custom as a source of law. Only recently have the 
forerunners of the modern study of colonial law 
suggested that indigenous custom had the same 
value as the fueros in Castilian law, occupying the 
second position in the order of the sources of law, 
just below the special Castilian legislation enforced 
in the Indies.15
But notably, whatever position indigenous cus-
tom may have had in the Spanish legal system, 
from the time of Leyes Nuevas (1542–1543) indig-
enous customs received special treatment within 
the formal legislation, coexisting with it in a plural-
istic legal scheme. As usually happens in the con-
text of legal transplantation, norms based on for-
eign models interact with pre-existing local ar-
rangements, accommodating, as Twining under-
lines, the institutionalised normative orders com-
posed by bodies of social norms and practices.16 It 
is interesting to note that, in the Latin American 
experience, this phenomenon resulted from a doc-
trine (propounded by pre-eminent intellectuals 
such as José de Acosta, Bartolomé de las Casas, 
Alonso de Zorita and Juan Polo de Ondegardo) 
that demanded the inclusion of indigenous groups 
into the socio-legal colonial system, allowing them 
to preserve their ancient legal organisation in 
matters where custom did not contravene Spanish 
Crown legislation and Christian principles.17
Hence, an important aspect of colonial legislation 
was the adaptation of Castilian law and institutions 
to the customs present in the New World, and 
thus, multiple social and legal normative orders 
related to each other and interacted during the 
period of Spanish rule.18
To ensure that indigenous customary law con-
formed to the rational Christian model and Cas-
tilian law, colonial authorities, including judges, 
ministers, theologians, jurists and visitors, under-
took a concise analysis of indigenous customary 
practices. Ethnographic notes and the direct testi-
mony of indigenous people were fundamental 
tools for that purpose. This analysis permitted 
toleration of a relatively large number of usages, 
even those considered »clumsy«. Nevertheless, the 
final aim of this policy was to bring about the 
gradual extinction of aboriginal customs by means 
of their Christianisation. Remarkably, this was the 
doctrine supported by the most important com-
mentator on Indian law, Juan Solórzano Pereira 
(1575–1655).19
It is notable that, among the indigenous cus-
toms allowed, ranging from the tax system, mita, 
procedural law and, albeit decreasingly penal, mar-
riage and inheritance law, the recognition of in-
digenous communities’ land rights was also in-
cluded. The creation of indigenous towns legiti-
mised the traditional land tenure rights of many 
12 See B (1956) 202.
13 For a general review of this assump-
tion, see T A (2000) 45 f.
14 A (1948) 120. See also 
G  S S (1995).
15 See, for instance, the classical study of 
M M (1967) 70. On 
the character of custom as a »ius 
proprium« see B G
(2000) 352.
16 See T (2010) 515, 516.
17 G (1951) 198 f.
18 On the reciprocal influence of pre-
Hispanic and Castilian law during 
colonial times, see M U
(1973) and G  S 
S (1983).
19 For a general review of this position, 
see T A (2000) 73.
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indigenous communities in the eyes of Western 
law. The Spaniards, in fact, recognised officially 
that indigenous people had a right according to 
European legal doctrine to use community lands in 
the form of reducciones, pueblos de indios, congrega-
ciones and so on. Nonetheless, indigenous groups 
received only a right of possession, not a property 
right to the land, since in colonial times reductions 
were considered mere holders of usage or usufruc-
tuary rights on lands belonging to the Crown.20
By the end of the 17th century the Recopilación 
de leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (Compilation of 
the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies, 1680) 
established a general law for all the Indies by 
generalising norms that, in their origins, were 
addressed to local towns. The Laws of the Indies 
represented the rationalist aspiration among intel-
lectual legal circles of the 17th century of building 
a unique and definite legal tool. As far as custom 
was concerned, the Laws of the Indies did recog-
nise custom as a source of law by admitting a wide 
range of indigenous usages.21 This represents a 
significant milestone in the positivisation of cus-
tom in Latin America. However, since the written 
law held higher status, there was a common under-
standing among Indian commentators about the 
limited role of custom in Spanish Crown Law. 
Thus, by the end of the 17th century Indian legal 
intellectuals had already identified written law as 
the main source of their legal system.22
3.2 The republican era
Although the application of indigenous cus-
toms became more rigid, legal pluralism remained 
a prominent feature of the colonial legal system 
until the end. However, this arrangement was to 
change drastically with the advent of Latin Amer-
ican independence. Three legal milestones devel-
oped during republican times help to understand 
that change: the codification of private law (mainly 
carried out in the 19th century); the influence of 
Kelsen’s legal positivism; and the introduction of 
indigenismo and indianismo in the legal discourse, 
both of which occurred in the 20th century.
But if it is true that indigenous customs sur-
passed colonial law, de facto penetrating the nor-
mative system during a greater part of the repub-
lican period, the question arises how it was possible 
in a context dominated by written law and legal 
positivism. Only by explaining the interaction 
between these three legal milestones does an an-
swer emerge.
3.2.1 The codification of private law
Since the second half of the 18th century, a legal 
theory arose that considered the law to be a ration-
al creation. The entire legal system was reduced to 
the enactment of a set of organic, coherent and 
clearly written laws. In this scenario, custom was 
considered a mere relic of an earlier period of legal 
evolution. Accordingly, legal pluralism or »norma-
tivism«, developed during colonial times, was con-
fronted with the idea of rationalism, which in-
volved the notion of »monism«.
Furthermore, with the enactment of the Laws of 
the Indies in 1680, the ground had already been 
prepared for the process codifying private law. So 
in a context dominated by the so-called »culture of 
the code«,23 custom was simply written out of the 
civil code as a source of law. 
Civil codes, like the Chilean one, defined what 
should be understood as »law« (Article 1), but 
omitted any concept of custom superseding the 
Castilian legal tradition, which was mainly con-
tained in the Siete Partidas of 13th century24 and de-
fined custom very precisely. However, this should 
come as no surprise, since this was the effect of a 
process started in Europe during the second half of 
the 18th century. This scheme, commonly known 
as »legal-centrism«, predicated the validity of cus-
tom on the recognition of written law. Although 
the details of this legal phenomenon, broadly 
clarified by European and Latin American scholars, 
are beyond the current discussion, the main con-
sequence of the codification in the field of custom 
in Latin America deserves some attention.
Codification of civil law in America began in 
1808. In that year the state of Louisiana adopted 
the French Civil Code. A similar method was 
followed in Oaxaca (1828–1829), Bolivia (1831), 
Costa Rica (1841), the Dominican Republic (1845) 
and Haiti (1816 and 1825).25
20 For more on this, see D 
R (1990) 120ff.; M 
N (2013a) 119.
21 See, for instance, L. 4, tit. I, lib. II.
22 For details, see T A
(2000) 140 f.
23 T A (2000) 8.
24 See 1, 2, 4.
25 For details, see G B (2000); 
R N (1997).
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This trend of codifying private law can be 
understood by looking at the process of consolidat-
ing independence. For republican authorities, pri-
vate law represented the most effective legal tool to 
achieve independence and to ensure political con-
trol; private law reform would then lead to the 
desired internal order within the new states.26 In 
addition, it is well-known that the code repre-
sented a political instrument necessary to over-
come the »legal particularism / pluralism« of the 
colonial period.27 Therefore, the civil code was 
introduced both to strengthen national unity and 
to replace the old legal pluralism of colonial times 
with a rigorous monism.28
Moreover, Latin American civil codes were a 
vehicle to transport a version of liberal positivism, 
specifically l’exégèse of the 19th century. Conse-
quently, the civil code helped to depict the law as 
a state-centric creation and to depict written law as 
an all-embracing solution. Accordingly, the role of 
other sources of law, such as customs, court deci-
sions and legal doctrine, was barely subsidiary.
By around 1880, almost all Latin American 
countries had a civil code. Latin American civil 
codes approved in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury were more original than their predecessors. 
For instance, the civil codes of Chile (1855) and 
Argentina (1869) symbolise the capacity of their 
redactors (Bello and Vélez-Sarsfield) to propose 
creative solutions to the most wide-ranging issues 
of civil law. Yet in the field of custom, these codes 
reproduced the pattern of their main source of 
codification: the French Civil Code. 
In French codification, custom was simply not 
admitted as a source of law. In fact, the Code 
Napoléon omitted it. The same solution was adopt-
ed by the Peruvian Civil Code of 1852, Article 9 of 
which excludes custom from the sources of law. By 
contrast, the Chilean Civil Code admitted custom 
in Article 2 but only as secundum legem, and in 
doing so adopted the same solution enounced in 
Article 10 of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811. This 
narrow recognition of custom was reproduced in 
those countries where the Chilean Civil Code was 
taken as a model, including, for instance, El Salva-
dor in 1859; Ecuador in 1861; Honduras in 1906; 
Uruguay in 1868; and Argentina in 1869. Further, 
it should be noted that custom as a »subsidiary 
source of the written law« was excluded from 
almost all Hispano-American civil codes, with the 
exception of those that adopted the Spanish Civil 
Code of 1899 (for political reasons), which include 
Honduras in 1899, Cuba in 1899 and Puerto Rico 
in 1899.29
What did this limited recognition of custom 
imply for indigenous law? What space remained in 
Latin American codification to accommodate in-
digenous custom? 
The answer, at this point, is obvious. As Guz-
mán Brito asserts, at the time of writing their civil 
codes the Ibero-American countries ignored the 
tradition of indigenous law, which broadly inte-
grated indigenous customs, despite indigenous 
peoples making up a significant part of their 
populations. The reason is clear: the right of the 
indigenous was at most a special law and, as such, 
had no place in a general and common law like the 
civil code.30 Additionally, following Ossorio y 
Gallardo’s Anteproyecto of the Bolivian Civil Code, 
this omission can be attributed to »the mere trans-
lation for America of the legal and political as-
sumptions of the French Revolution, which of 
course did not include the presence of the Indi-
an«.31 Significantly then, the civil code ignored the 
presence of the Indio and, therefore, of their 
customs as it took for granted their disintegration 
and transformation into the model of modern 
citizens.32
3.2.2 The twentieth century: legal positivism, 
indigenismo and indianismo
In legal terms, the 20th century in Latin America 
can be described as the Kelsen century. Indeed, 
Kelsen’s theory had a particular influence on the 
way lawyers and judges think about law even up to 
the present. Rather than provide an extended 
explanation of the local transplantation and trans-
mutation of his work, my intention is to focus on 
one particular effect of his theory in the current 
context, clearly suggested by López Medina, that 
Kelsen’s theory »served to give a new impulse to 
26 See M (2004) 98; C
(1989) 81.
27 See G B (2000) 219.
28 T  V (1989) 85; T
(1976) 29.
29 For a review on custom into Ibero-
American codification, see G 
B (1987).
30 G B (1987) 254.
31 O  G (1943) 275.
32 For general review on this point, see 
M (2015) 430–432.
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the hegemony of legal positivism«.33 Kelsen dis-
plays a formalistic concept of custom; that is to 
say, »in order for custom to be valid, it must be 
endowed as a law-creating fact and have some 
sovereign imprimatur«.34
This view of custom was common among 
private law scholars throughout the 20th century. 
A glaring example appears in one of the most 
important commentaries of the Chilean Civil 
Code. In his outstanding work, Explicaciones de 
Derecho civil chileno y comparado, Luis Claro Solar 
asserted that »in a country like Chile, where the 
law is the result of the constitutional powers, 
which exercise the sovereignty entrusted to them 
by the nation, the law cannot be at the same time 
the result of work of the community of citizens«. 
Therefore, he added, »written law is a source of 
law; custom is not«.35 Remarkably, Chilean schol-
ars and students continue to work on the basis of 
Claro Solar’s assumptions.
But, on the other hand, it is also true that this 
view of custom was not uniform in the Latin 
American legal doctrine of the 20th century. An 
example of a contrary theory was the work of the 
Argentinean Manuel A. Sáez. In his Observaciones 
críticas sobre el Código Civil, which he wrote in 
1883, Sáez dedicated forty pages to criticising the 
narrow recognition of custom stated in Article 17 
of the Argentinean Civil Code.36 This kind of 
effort, continued by others in Chile and Peru 
during the 1920s, took Darwinian and Comtean 
evolutionary theories into account as well as the 
legal-evolutionary works of Maine and D’Agguano 
to criticise the »ode« to written law as a perfect and 
unique tool of legal production. In any case, these 
were only marginal voices, as was true of the 
reception of others’ anti-formalistic theories, such 
as those of Geny and Altamira.
For the foregoing, it would be easy to assume 
that the fate of indigenous customs in the 20th cen-
tury was entirely tied to the State conception of 
law. But while this assumption holds for most 
Latin American legal systems, the influence of 
indigenous customs on formal law is more com-
plex.
The 20th century represents the beginning of an 
exceptional period of recognition for indigenous 
law all over the world. From a general perspective, 
in the Latin America legal context this period is 
related to two different fields of study on indige-
nous issues based on two central concepts: indige-
nismo and indianismo.
The former relates to the scientific analysis of 
aboriginal ancestral usages and customs, some of 
which are still in force, largely studied by histo-
rians, legal historians, ethnographers and anthro-
pologists. A clear example of this approach was 
»legal indigenism«, a movement lead by Peruvian 
jurists in the first part of the 20th century in a first 
attempt to understand the role of indigenous 
customary practices in the formal legal system. 
Significantly, the first legal recognition of indige-
nous communities in Peru, which was included in 
the 1920 and 1933 Peruvian constitutions, came as 
result of the pluralistic legal atmosphere that in-
digenismo had created.37
The latter approach on indigenous matters 
emerged in the second part of the 20th century. It 
comprised a series of political initiatives, mostly by 
indigenous intellectuals or supporters of indige-
nous causes, devised to institute a new order based 
on an aboriginal cosmology that rejects the polit-
ical and legal rules imposed by Western culture. An 
example of this approach is katarism, a movement 
born in Bolivia by the end of the 1960s among 
Aymaras’ intellectual circles with the aim of pro-
posing a cultural and political order based on the 
indigenous right of self-determination.38 It should 
be emphasised that katarism and similar indianistic 
movements were important social-intellectual 
sources for the Bolivian Constitution of 2009. In 
fact, this constitution, approved during the first 
administration of Evo Morales, was the first to 
recognize Bolivia as a pluri-national State, giving 
broad space not only to the indigenous customs 
but, more importantly, to their philosophical prin-
ciples. Accordingly, the pluri-national State is 
based on the suma qamaña, that is, on the Aymara 
principle of »vivir bien« (to live well), which con-
sists of the material and spiritual balance of the 
33 L M (2004) 342, 343.
34 B (2010) 41.
35 C S (1979 [1898]) 42–43.
36 See T A (1991).
37 On the implications of this move-
ment, see G (2005); R 
N (2006) 210 f.; G 
(2009) 94 f; M N (2010).
38 See R C (1986); 
B (2008); L (2008).
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individual (knowing how to live) and in the same 
harmonious relationship with all forms of exist-
ence (living together).39 The Ecuadorian Constitu-
tion of 2008 similarly recognised the quechua 
principle of sumak kawsay, »buen vivir« (good liv-
ing) as an institutional basis for the pluri-national 
State. This concept derives from an ancient Andean 
principle of humans and nature co-existing »har-
moniously«. Clearly, concepts such as holism, eco-
logical ethics and Andean cosmology emerge as 
tangible values of the new institutional order.40
The implications for indianismo are then vast. 
Notably, in a promising scenario for social plural-
ism, indigenous customs, which are broadly ad-
mitted, are something more than a mere source of 
law; they constitute a »way of life« recognised and 
implemented by the State as an assertion of the 
Bolivian and Ecuadorian native cosmologies.
4 The Chilean case: Mapuche lands, customs 
and State law
Brendan Tobin has trenchantly written that »the 
relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
traditional lands is the most tangible aspect of 
customary law« and that »land tenure is perhaps 
the most problematic issue in customary law«.41
These assertions can be easily confirmed by exam-
ining Mapuche history in the context of the Chil-
ean Republic. 
There are various reasons for studying the Ma-
puche case. The size of its population,42 its partic-
ular history of resisting the imposition of Spanish 
rule,43 and the particular mode of land use44 are 
issues to be considered from both ethnohistorical 
and legal perspectives. But perhaps the most rele-
vant is the current conflict they are engaged in with 
the Chilean State relating to land ownership in the 
Araucanía region.
The cause of this conflict can generally be traced 
to the annexation of Mapuche lands in Araucanía 
by the early Republic of Chile.45 Indeed, the civi-
lising programme adopted by the Chilean govern-
ment in the 19th century allowed it to colonise the 
entire Araucanía region with Chileans and de-
scendants of European immigrants. Some of those 
land titles were given or sold to the settlers by the 
government, while other lands were purchased 
from indigenous leaders.
Two central questions arise from this general 
background: how has the relationship between 
State law and customary law in Mapuche territo-
ries developed, and what problems do contempo-
rary Chilean jurists and legal operators face regard-
ing the recognition of indigenous land rights? 
The first point to note is that the recognition of 
indigenous customary land law is a recent achieve-
ment in the Chilean legal tradition. 
In December 1970, during the second National 
Congress of the Mapuche people held in Temuco, 
President Allende presented the preliminary dra 
39 See C (2013) 6 f.; A
(2012).
40 See H (2010) 15; Z
(2012).
41 T (2014) 100–101.
42 The Mapuche are the largest ethnic 
group in Chile. In 2002, the date of 
the last official Chilean national cen-
sus, indigenous peoples were esti-
mated to represent 4.6 % of the total 
Chilean population. 692 000 were 
self-identified persons of indigenous 
origins, and Mapuche people ac-
counted for approximately 85 % of 
this number. So officially 4 % of the 
total Chilean population, 604 000 in-
habitants, self-identified as Mapuche. 
More current records (the national 
census of 2012 that is yet to be rati-
fied) estimate that the Mapuche pop-
ulation is growing and constitutes 
approximately 10 % (about 1 500 000 
inhabitants) of the Chilean popula-
tion. The majority of Mapuche people 
(about 1 000 000) is currently settled 
in the south-central region of Arau-
canía. For statistics, see http://www.
ine.cl/canales/chile_estadistico/
estadisticas_sociales_culturales/
etnias/etnias.php (accessed 14 April 
2015).
43 In fact, because of the Arauco War, 
which persisted between Spaniards 
and the southern Mapuche people for 
nearly 350 years, all Chilean territory 
south of the Bío Bío River, with the 
exception of the Chiloe Archipelago, 
was largely freed from Western rule. 
For a historical account of this war, 
see B (2007a) 213 f.
44 The Mapuche group, in common 
with other aboriginal inhabitants of 
the Andes, set up a discontinuous 
system of land possession by holding 
lands in different ecological levels. 
From their origins they have been a 
semi-nomadic society that transver-
sally occupied the southern Andes in 
current Argentina and Chile. The 
Mapuches’ seasonal movement al-
lows them to utilise the highlands 
during the summer, mainly for pas-
ture (veranadas) and the lowlands or 
valley areas during the winter (inver-
nadas). Similar patterns of transhu-
mance are widespread in Europe as 
well in cases such as the Italian uso 
civico, also known as alpeggio, and the 
Swiss traditional land use known as 
Alpwirtscha. For more on these kinds 
of land use, use see R /
T (1975); N (1981).
45 For an indispensable analysis of the 
Mapuche conflict, see: B
(2007b). See also, for a complemen-
tary perspective on this question, 
R S / V 
E (2015).
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of a new Indian Act, which was sent to Parliament 
in May 1971 and finally promulgated on 15 Sep-
tember 1972. This law marks a milestone in Chil-
ean indigenous legislation, since, for the first time, 
the division of land was not the main aim of State 
law.46 Indeed, from 1927 to 1961 the division of 
community lands was proposed as an instrument 
to integrate indigenous peoples into the nation or, 
as was indicated by Decree 266 of 20 May 1931, the 
division of land was considered »the only way to 
fully incorporate them into civilisation«.47
This attitude towards the indigenous people has 
been the common policy of every Chilean govern-
ment since independence. The few allusions to the 
words indio or indígena, at least until 1972, were 
merely included to refer to the civilising mission of 
the State.48 Clearly, the fictitious nation created 
under republican law does not fit with indigenous 
culture, which was »legally assimilated« into the 
model of the modern citizen sponsored by the 
liberal State.49 On that basis, Chilean and Argen-
tinian agrarian legislation of the second half of 
the 19th century promoted civilising the Indians 
through the acquisition of their »uncultivated« 
land. In doing so, the government condoned a 
colonisation policy that, in short, imposed a Euro-
pean concept of land use and the commercial 
notions associated with it. Theoretically speaking, 
the process of occupying Mapuche land involved 
the ancient doctrine of terra nullius in the typical 
ethnocentric sense: the indigenous peoples of the 
territories did not have property rights, since they 
were nomadic populations and did conform to the 
western legal doctrine of territorial acquisition.50
There is little doubt that, from the second half 
of the 19th century onwards, pressure increased to 
modify customs on indigenous land uses through-
out Latin America. Around this time, the Chilean 
government militarily occupied the Araucanía re-
gion (Pacificación de la Araucanía 1861–1883) and 
subsequently introduced the notion of property as 
a fixed asset. The Decree of 4 December 1866 or-
dered the distribution of Mapuche territory, estab-
lishing a three-tiered land classification scheme 
that still exists to this day: indigenous, private 
and public. Further, the government implemented 
a series of measures to promote individual and 
State land ownership through colonisation.51
To civilise the Indians dispossessed by these 
measures, Indian towns or reducciones were 
founded, and it was not long before the semi-
nomadic Mapuche people were converted to a 
sedentary lifestyle. This reduction of ancestral Ma-
puche lands was supported by a series of legal 
innovations. The end of the Pacificación de la Arau-
canía, for instance, settled the indigenous peoples 
in their new lands. In 1883, a law established the 
Comisión Radicadora de Indígenas, a public institu-
tion that granted nearly three thousand land titles, 
known as »títulos de merced«, in the south-central 
provinces of Arauco and Osorno between 1884 and 
1929.52 The land was then entitled, in common 
property, to the head of the household on behalf of 
the lineage he represented. For its part, the State 
became the absolute owner of all the remaining 
land from south of the Bío Bío river, in which the 
Mapuche people were unable to prove possession 
for at least a year. Such territories were considered 
uninhabited and available for colonisation by in-
troducing »modern citizens« mainly of European 
provenance.53
To summarise, the Chilean legislative measures 
enacted in the second half of the 19th century 
introduced the Western concept of common prop-
erty (reducciones) in Mapuche territories and the 
colonisation of the remaining land by imposing 
the notion of individual property. These are the two 
main effects of a more general and common 
phenomenon that exists throughout the Latin 
American rural landscape: the expansion of agri-
cultural liberalism, primarily by compromising the 
customs of the indigenous communities.
Allende’s 1970 legislation was then a brief 
interruption in Chilean republican legal history. 
46 For more about the land reform on 
the Mapuche territories in this pe-
riod, see: C C et al. 
(2005). 
47 See M N (2013b) 40.
48 For a detailed study of the constitu-
tional provisions related indigenous 
people in Latin America, see C
(2006). 
49 For an indispensable analysis to this 
respect, see L (2004). 
50 For more on this, see M N
(2015) 428–430.
51 See A (1995) 19; M 
N (2013b) 28 f.
52 G C (1986) 7. 
53 W (1998) 235.
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Indeed, the division of Mapuche lands worsened 
under the military regime (1973–1990). Further, 
military legislation (Decree Laws 2568 and 2750, 
1979) promoted the division of all remaining 
communities or reducciones into individual lots. 
The objective was to put an end to the special 
status of Indians and their lands by integrating 
them into the rules of the monistic-civil law 
scheme. As a consequence, almost all Mapuche 
communities were divided and the resulting small-
holdings impoverished the rural Mapuche popula-
tion, accelerating their migration to urban centres. 
This phenomenon would be noted in the 1992 
census, which found that about 80 % of the Ma-
puche population was urban, while only the re-
maining 20 % was rural. 
At present, the legal status of indigenous groups 
in Chile is notably different from other Latin 
American contexts. Following the Chilean repub-
lican tradition, the indígena simply does not ap-
pear in the 1980 Constitution. 
An answer to how State law and conventional 
legal academia deal with indigenous customary 
practices is sorely lacking. But in practice, further 
efforts to recognise indigenous customs and their 
land rights have been gradually made. This oc-
curred by means of two major legal tools.
The first one is special legislation. In order to 
protect, promote and develop indigenous groups, 
the Indigenous Act, Ley Indígena (n. 19.253), was 
introduced in 1993. This Act marked a real mile-
stone in the Chilean legal tradition, as it was the 
first time the multi-ethnicity of Chilean society was 
officially declared. Significantly, the Indigenous 
Act is the first instrument to have written down 
indigenous customs.54 For instance, according to 
the Indigenous Act, custom invoked in a trial 
between indigenous people belonging to the same 
ethnic group constitutes law, whenever it is com-
patible with the constitution. Consequently, any 
case involving custom must be accredited in court 
by all the means provided for by law and especially 
with a report of an expert from the National 
Indigenous Development Corporation (CONADI) 
at the request of the Court.55 In addition, an Act of 
February 2008 (Laenche Law n. 20.249) creates 
the Marine Coastal Area of Indigenous Peoples, 
which aims »to protect the customary use of these 
spaces, in order to maintain the traditions and the 
use of natural resources in the hands of the com-
munities linked to the coastline«. Accordingly, the 
law delegates the administration of coastal marine 
areas to indigenous communities or associations of 
them, whose members have exercised customary 
use of that space (art. 3, 2 e).
The second major legal instrument to recognise 
indigenous peoples and their land rights is the 
September 2008 ratification of the 169 ILO Con-
vention. The Convention included a minimal reg-
ulatory standard that the States parties observe 
regarding indigenous peoples. As a result, since 
its entry into force in 2009, the Chilean legal 
system has been challenged on its implementation 
in various areas, mostly on issues relating to cus-
tom. The most relevant aspects of the 169 Con-
vention are related to the right of prior consulta-
tion, which has generated abundant jurisprudence 
at the highest level,56 and to the restitution of 
ancestral territories based on an evolutionary in-
terpretation of the notion of property in Article 21 
of the American Convention on Human Rights.57
Consequently, the theoretical debate about the 
validity of aboriginal titles among the new sources 
of law is now remarkably open.58
54 Article 7 recognises the right of in-
digenous peoples to maintain and 
develop their cultural manifestations, 
according to Chilean morality, good 
customs and public order. Article 12 
conceptualises the notion of »indige-
nous lands« by indicating among 
them »those who have been histori-
cally occupied by indigenous com-
munities and of which they have 
current possession«. Article 18 estab-
lishes that inheritance law in com-
munity lands is subject to the custom 
that each ethnicity has on those mat-
ters. Indigenous customs in the field 
of justice are recognised in Article 54. 
Finally, the Act recognises some tra-
ditional organisations (such as cacica-
dos, Article 61) and regulates specific 
institutions for various ethnic groups.
55 For more on the recognition of cus-
tomary practices in Chile, see 
C / V (2009).
56 See G Z (2013); 
F (2015).
57 See, generally, C S
(2012); S (2013).
58 On the theoretical implications of 
indigenous land titles, see: A 
C (2005). Furthermore, the 
institutional collaboration of the 
State with private institutions in the 
area of collective land claims seems to 
be growing. An example of this is the 
support given by the Fundación Insti-
tuto Indígena to the Mitrauken com-
munities (Francisco Cayul and Kuyv-
mentu Pewen, in the commune of 
Lonquimay), which culminated in 
August 2008 with the recovery of 
2 735 hectares of veranadas lands from 
State control. For more on this, see 
F (2011). See also http://www.
territoriochile.cl/1516/article-76276.
html (accessed 2 February 2015).
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In light of these legal milestones, the question 
arises about the role and discussion of conven-
tional private law with regard to indigenous cus-
toms. Can this issue be fruitfully investigated? Is 
native custom even considered?
At last, the debate seems to have started. The 
most recent and complete commented edition of 
the Chilean Civil Code, written by the legal histo-
rian Javier Barrientos Grandón, devotes consider-
able space to indigenous customs in relation to 
Article 2. Barrientos explains that indigenous cus-
tom is a »kind of custom« under Chilean law, with 
its own statute, distinct from custom in the civil 
law. Notably, these are the first words related to the 
indigenous matters ever written in a work devoted 
to the Chilean civil law.59
Furthermore, from a comparative perspective, 
the new Argentinean Civil and Commercial Code, 
which came into force on 1 August 2015, has also 
innovated in the area of private law. Although no 
rules concerning indigenous customs have been 
introduced, Article 18 recognises the land of in-
digenous communities in an important and un-
precedented way: »indigenous communities have 
the right to possession and ownership of the lands 
traditionally occupied and those other suitable and 
sufficient for human development as provided by 
law, in accordance with the provisions of Article 75 
paragraph 17 of the Constitution«. Unquestion-
ably, this rule will encourage civil law scholars to 
analyse a classic institution of private law and 
property law from a new perspective, one that 
considers the history and anthropology of indige-
nous peoples. Accordingly, the »lands traditionally 
occupied« should not be considered a mere asset, 
but an integral part of the symbolic and spiritual 
environment necessary for the development of 
traditional culture. This represents a new legal 
category that will require fresh reflection from civil 
law scholars in order to meet the challenge of 
embracing the alternative legal cosmology that 
flows from the holistic relationship of the Ma-
puche groups with their land. 
I am hopeful that things finally seem to be 
changing in my discipline.
n
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